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For the purpose of this discussion, I shall
distinguish between &dquo;pure&dquo; and &dquo;applied&dquo;
research (or science) on the basis of what is
expected from it by society or, more pre-
cisely, by the agencies that support it. The
expectations are specified in the statements of
aims when research institutes are established
or when projects are financed. They are mani-
fested in reports rendered to the supporting
agencies. I shall call &dquo;pure&dquo; research that
which fulfills the expectations by making
some portion of the world better understood
without necessarily bringing it under manipu-
lative control. By &dquo;applied&dquo; research I shall
understand that which makes possible an ex-
tension of control over some portion of the
world.
Institutionalized science, that is, research
organized into large enterprises with admini-
strative structures, chains of authority, divi-
sion of labor, budget accounting, etc., is all
applied science. It has come into being in
industrial societies where &dquo;progress&dquo; is iden-
tified with increasing manipulative control
over the environment. Industrial societies
support these large scientific enterprises and
expect that their &dquo;product&dquo; will contribute to
&dquo;progress.&dquo; The most obvious successes of
applied science have been translated into
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technological advances. &dquo;Control of environ-
ment&dquo; thus acquired its conventional mean-
ing : channeling forces of nature to do man’s
work (industrial technology); corraling energy
for use against human enemies (military tech-
nology) ; shielding man from diseases (medical
technology).
In the last two decades, the &dquo;behavioral
sciences&dquo; became another sector of institu-
tionalized science. The social expectations
with regard to the behavioral sciences are
reflected in the theme that usually underlies
the arguments for social support of institu-
tionalized behavioral science:
&dquo;Science has been phenomenally successful in
providing solutions to age-old problems. It has
made man master of his environment. It has pro-
longed life and has overcome many diseases. Now
there is a widespread recognition that man’s under-
standing of his environment has far outstripped his
understanding of himself. As a result, man is help-
less before a host of social ills, many of which
spring from the very lag between man’s ability to
control nature and his ability to control himself.
We need a science of man to solve the social prob-
lems that have arisen in the rapidly changing man-
made environment.&dquo;
Now, institutionalized research in the
natural sciences was not established to cope
with problems so formulated, such as: man is
enslaved by physical toil; man is plagued by
diseases, etc. It was only after the potentiali-
ties of the natural sciences for solving tech-
nical problems became apparent that natural
science was institutionalized. Nevertheless,
in spite of the fact that few, if any, of the so-
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called social problems have been formulated
as problèmes bien posis, the behavioral sci-
ences have been partially institutionalized in
the sense that a measure of public support is
given to organized projects in the behavioral
sciences, increasingly recognized as a branch
of the &dquo;scientific enterprise.&dquo;
I believe this development can be attributed
to two circumstances. First, there is a &dquo;halo
effect.&dquo; Science has been uniformly successful
in &dquo;solving problems.&dquo; Social ills are seen as
&dquo;problems&dquo; and it seems sensible to direct
the proven tools of scientific investigation
toward the task of coming to grips with them.
The fact that the social &dquo;problems,&dquo; as usual-
ly stated, are not scientifically tractable prob-
lems is obscured by language. Second, the
needs of business, of the military establish-
ment, and of complex technology direct atten-
tion to certain aspects of human behavior.
Accordingly, behavioral scientists have been
enlisted in the service of business, of the mili-
tary, and of technocracy. We now have, as
branches of institutionalized behavioral sci-
ence, industrial psychology, where the object
of study is man as a component of a technical
complex; market research, where man is
studied as a consumer or as an object of per-
suasion through the mass media; and so on.
Sociology is represented through its tech-
niques in assessing mass moods and &dquo;public
opinion&dquo;; anthropology has contributed to
techniques of counter-insurgency, and so on.
These &dquo;technical&dquo; branches of social science
disciplines, concerned essentially with so-
called human engineering, provide the princi-
pal leverage to the increasing institutionaliza-
tion of the behavioral sciences. At the same
time the lofty ideal of directing the scientific
method toward the alleviation of social ills
provides a stimulus to public support and,
perhaps, serves the function of attracting con-
cerned young people to the study of the social
sciences. This is the &dquo;halo effect.&dquo;
The prospects for an applied &dquo;science of
peace&dquo; should be examined in this setting.
The goal of peace research, as it is usually
stated, is to discover conditions that facilitate
or inhibit the establishment of world peace or,
alternately, conditions that facilitate or in-
hibit wars. On this basis, suggestions have
been made for making peace research a re-
cipient of public or semi-public funds. The
extent to which such support can be obtained
depends, as in the case of the behavioral
sciences, on two factors: the &dquo;halo effect&dquo;
and prospects for technical accomplishments.
The &dquo;halo effect&dquo; derives from tacitly iden-
tifying &dquo;research&dquo; with the understanding of
a phenomenon and gaining control over it.
We have learned to control the forces of
nature by understanding their &dquo;operations.&dquo;
We have learned to control or eradicate dis-
eases by understanding their etiology. In the
same way, it is believed, we should be able
to eliminate large scale conflicts-such as
wars-once we have understood the condi-
tions that inhibit or facilitate them.
On closer reflection, however, it can be seen
that understanding a phenomenon does not
automatically confer the power of controlling
it. For example, few phenomena are so well
understood as the motions of heavenly bodies;
yet it is unfortunately (or, perhaps, fortu-
nately) not given to man to control them.
However, since understanding is so frequently
a prelude to control, research aimed at under-
standing can be justified on utilitarian
grounds as preparing the way for eventual
control. This is especially true when under-
standing and control are on the same &dquo;level,&dquo;
so to speak. For instance, a complete under-
standing of physiological aging, or of cancer,
can be expected to be expressible in biophysi-
cal or biochemical terms. It is highly probable
that control of these processes will also in-
volve biophysical or biochemical interven-
tion.
The situation is different if understanding
and control are on different &dquo;levels.&dquo; We
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understand the &dquo;cause&dquo; of the impending
population explosion very well. It is a direct
consequence of the drastic reduction in infant
mortality, especially in countries with large
birth rates. Moreover, we have the technical
means of controlling births without recourse
to sexual abstinence. What we cannot do at
present is make these means available to the
bulk of the world population and assure their
use even if they are available. So, while the
problem of birth control has been effectively
solved on the physiological level, the solution
of the population problem eludes us on the
social level. We do not even know whether on
that level the obstacles to the solution are
primarily political, sociological, or psycho-
logical ; that is, whether concerned efforts to
solve the problem should be directed toward
enlisting the help of highly placed political
leaders, or of local social leaders; or whether
it is more important to design techniques of
birth control more acceptable to the people
of the various cultures. Or it may be that the
&dquo;solution&dquo; lies in an entirely different direc-
tion-for example, an increase of the global
food supply, on the supposition that a well-
fed population is freed from psychological
compulsions to procreate at a maximum rate.
However (and here is the main point), even if
we knew &dquo;the answer,&dquo; the problem would
still remain unsolved unless institutions were
created through which the solution could be
implemented. For it is not enough to say what
must be done. It is also necessary to say who
should do it. And if the designated agency is
powerless or unwilling or does not exist, the
&dquo;solution&dquo; is not a solution. The problem is
merely relegated to another level.
As another example, let us examine a social
problem effectively solved, at least in the
technically advanced countries, namely the
control of certain epidemics. Typhoid is con-
trolled by purifying water supplies; smallpox
is controlled by vaccination. The medical
problem of identifying the cause of typhoid
was solved long ago. Thereafter the control of
typhoid became an engineering problem, not
a medical one. And the solution of this prob-
lem, in turn, depended on the cooperation of
politicians (as is dramatized in Ibsen’s play,
The Enemy of the People). Mass vaccination
involves mass indoctrination and appropriate
institutions. Only the existence of such insti-
tutions permits us to push the solution to the
end, so to speak. To avoid smallpox, a person
should be vaccinated. This is saying what
must be done. But who is to do it? We have
the answer to that question: a nurse. But a
nurse needs a place, a needle, vaccine. Who is
to provide them? A public health agency. A
public health agency needs authority to ad-
minister mass vaccinations. Who is to give
it? The Department or Ministry of Health.
And the department is itself a creation of the
highest organs of government, which are also
enlisted in inducing people to submit to vac-
cination.
All applied science implies an institutional
structure. In each case of &dquo;problems solved by
science,&dquo; institutions have existed ready to
receive the knowledge gained by the scientists
in their investigations, institutions willing and
able to translate that knowledge into techniques
and empowered to apply the techniques. The
fact that we spend our evenings in well-lit
rooms rather than by candlelight we owe not
only to Volta’s discoveries. We owe it to the
fact that the industrial age produced a social
role for the inventor, eager to translate the
discoveries of the physicists into utilitarian
ideas; to the fact the rewards for successful
inventions were so high that Edison was will-
ing to spend years in trial-and-error search
for a suitable filament for an electric bulb;
that the utility magnates saw the commercial
potentialities of the invention. My colleague
in the Soviet Union can substitute, for the last
link in that chain, Lenin’s conviction that
&dquo;socialism equals Soviet power plus electric
power,&dquo; and the consequent priorities given
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to electrification in that country’s industriali-
zation program. In short, institutional imple-
mentation is an indispensable phase in the
utilitarian exploitation of institutionalized
science.
The first question, then, that should occur
to those who hope to link peace research to an
applied science is the following: what institu-
tions are available, or can be reasonably ex-
pected to be created, that can translate the
findings of peace research into action directed
toward the solution of the problems posed to
it?
It is difficult to think of any. Recommenda-
tions for measures to be undertaken in the
interests of promoting peace are not lacking.
Some of them have been supported by careful
analyses and sober estimates. Proposals have
been made to establish a world government
and to strengthen the peace-keeping agencies
of the United Nations; plans for phased dis-
armament have been worked out and specifi-
cally designed to guarantee the security of the
disarming nations. Further research may
lead to a variety of additional proposals for
war-preventing and peace-keeping measures.
In short, there is no lack of knowledge about
&dquo;what men could do&dquo; to insure peace. The
question is how can such knowledge be used.
Note that in the case of scientific findings
relevant to technology, to war-making, or to
medicine, institutions exist wherein any sci-
entific findings that promise advances are
taken seriously. Here not only the question
&dquo;What should be done?&dquo; but also the ques-
tion &dquo;Who should do it?&dquo; can usually be an-
swered immediately and explicitly. And if
findings are sufficiently important and suffi-
ciently promising, then, if no existing institu-
tions can implement them, new institutions
are created. In the case of at least some plaus-
ible findings of peace research, especially
findings that relate the sources of war to some
firmly entrenched institutions, questions re-
lated to the implementation of proposed solu-
tions are bound to remain unanswered. Not
only are the institutions required to implement
such solutions nonexistent, but also prospects
of creating them are nil, because decision-
makers on whom institutional changes de-
pend and whose interests may be affected by
them are receptive to only a very limited
range of advice.
It may be argued that there is a fundamen-
tal difference between the findings of natural
science and the findings of social science on
which peace research would presumably
draw. The former are consistently and re-
markably reliable; the latter are not. This
is true. However, it is also true that the exis-
tence of institutions and their readiness to
translate &dquo;knowledge&dquo; into practice often has
little relation to the reliability of this knowl-
edge. For instance, the medical profession is
much older than scientific medicine. Before
the advent of scientific medicine, the healing
art consisted of practices based on a mixture
of crude experience and superstitions. The
speculations of physicians on the genesis of
disease were far from reliable knowledge. Yet
these speculations were readily translated into
practice by the medical profession. The
efficacy of the healing art remained very low.
Nevertheless, the fact that medicine existed as
an institution made scientific advances even-
tually possible, because the institution pro-
vided the opportunity for theory and prac-
tice to interact (a necessary condition for any
applied science), hence for a medical science
to develop. Because there are no institutions
where the theoretical findings of peace re-
search can interact with practice (say, insti-
tutions empowered to practice &dquo;experimental
foreign policy&dquo;), the prospects for developing
an applied &dquo;science of peace&dquo; remain dim.
The idea of &dquo;experiments in foreign policy&dquo;
may appear weird in view of the tremendous
dangers attending a &dquo;wrong experiment.&dquo;
However, these dangers can be properly
assessed only in comparison with the dan-
gers inherent in the foreign policies presently
conducted. It is not likely that present
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policy-makers would be inclined to make such
comparisons.
One prospect of institutionalizing peace
research, that is, of assuring it sources of
public support and a utilization of its find-
ings, does remain. This could be done if peace
research were centered on questions that the
policy-makers want answered and that, more-
over, can be answered in ways that do not
challenge the policy-makers’ accustomed
frameworks of thought.
One class of such questions relates to the
dangers of a so-called accidental war. The
spectre of accidental war has been raised by
the nuclear balance of terror. Since a country
can now be obliterated in a matter of minutes,
and since it is taken for granted that an attack
will be automatically retaliated, a &dquo;mistake&dquo;
in the initiation or transmission of messages
or orders (especially as the war machine be-
comes progressively more automated) can
trigger a holocaust that no one intended. Such
a prospect is not attractive to the decision-
makers of either of the two nuclear super-
powers ; consequently, technical solutions of
this &dquo;problem&dquo; are welcomed. Solutions are
envisaged essentially as safety margins against
the malfunctioning of the war machines. The
science involved in their design is technologi-
cal and therefore no challenge to political
habits of thought. Moreover, the solutions
are not expected to confer any real or imag-
ined political or military advantages on the
&dquo;enemy,&dquo; and so the political obstacles to
their implementation are minimal. On
grounds that the research involved in im-
proving the &dquo;safety&dquo; of the weapons systems
serves to alleviate the danger of war (in this
case of &dquo;accidental war&dquo;), it could, supposed-
ly, be called applied &dquo;peace research.&dquo;
Another class of questions that interest the
decision-makers of the superpowers, particu-
larly of the United States, are those related
to arms control. Because of the staggering
costs of the present military establishments,
and possibly for certain political reasons,
negotiations on arms control and even dis-
armament have been going on primarily be-
tween the Soviet Union and the United States.
By arms control the military experts usually
understand ceilings on armaments at or above
the present levels. Disarmament means any
reduction of the present levels.
Related issues are those involving the test-
ing of nuclear weapons. Testing in the atmo-
sphere, it will be recalled, attracted much
public attention because of the effects of
radioactive fallout, particularly the contami-
nation of milk with strontium 90 which gets
into children’s bones. Considerable public
pressure developed in the United States for
discontinuing the tests, and the issue became
one of political concern to the government.
Soviet leaders likewise considered a limita-
tion on the development of nuclear weapons
to be in their interest. After two years of
negotiations it was possible for the US and
the Soviet Union to effect an agreement to
refrain from further tests of nuclear weapons
in the atmosphere. What made the agreement
possible was the fact that atmospheric testing
is detectable anywhere on earth, which ob-
viated the necessity of on-site inspections to
prevent &dquo;cheating,&dquo; such inspections being
unacceptable to the Soviet Union. But, be-
cause on-site inspections could not be dis-
pensed with in the case of underground tests,
agreement on the suspension of these tests
could not be reached. Here, then, is another
purely technical problem, which, if solved,
would permit another step in the direction of
&dquo;arms control.&dquo; For, if on-site inspections
are actually the only obstacle to agreement
with regard to suspending underground tests,
then an improvement of seismographic tech-
niques may remove the obstacle by making
on-site inspections unnecessary.
Other problems related to arms control and
disarmament involve the determination of
limits on certain weapons (or possibly reduc-
tions of levels) which could not, in the opinion
of the military experts, &dquo;jeopardize the secur-
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ity of the nation.&dquo; Public Law 87-297, which
established the United States Arms Control
and Disarmament Agency, states this crite-
rion explicitly: &dquo;Arms control and disarma-
ment policy, being an important aspect of
foreign policy, must be consistent with na-
tional security policy as a whole.&dquo; Since
&dquo;national security&dquo; of the superpowers is de-
fined by those to whom it is entrusted, that is,
essentially by military experts, it is they who
are the final arbiters on what arms control and
disarmament measures may be undertaken. In
considering these questions, the experts must
carry out certain estimates and calculations,
mainly to determine what weapons may be
limited or abandoned without reducing the
indices in terms of which &dquo;national security&dquo;
is measured (e.g., over-kill, etc.). The use of
this expertise can also be subsumed under
applied &dquo;peace research.&dquo; Indeed, not only
the US Arms Control and Disarmament
Agency but also the RAND Corporation and
similar organizations engaged primarily in
weapons and strategic research have on oc-
casions pointed out that they, too, are doing
&dquo;peace research.&dquo;
These purely technical achievements of
&dquo;peace research&dquo; (if it can be so called) just
about exhaust the range of scientific findings
applied in the interest of preventing immedi-
ate war. Needless to say, the scope of these
achievements is severely limited and their
relevance to the central problem, the long-
range prevention of war and the advancement
of world peace, is questionable.
The situation parallels that in the institu-
tionalized behavioral sciences. The actual
applications of findings in the behavioral
sciences are limited to techniques that can be
used by existing institutions: business, mili-
tary, bureaucratic, etc. The grandiose aims
of a &dquo;science of man&dquo; remain unfulfilled. It
is not that social scientists do not exert efforts
to disclose and understand the roots of gross
social evils. Many do, and they freely publish
their findings. However, as has been said, a
science can become an applied science only in
the process of interacting theory and prac-
tice. If there are no institutions to provide the
practice, there will be no such interactions
and the theories will remain suspended in the
intellectual sphere, to be discussed for a while
and then forgotten. New theories will replace
them to suffer the same fate. Possibly, among
all the theories, some could provide the key
to the solution of important social problems.
But we shall never know, if the implementa-
tion of the solutions suggested by the theories
involves a radical overhauling of our institu-
tional structure.
Let us turn to peace research that does not
depend on support by the big research estab-
lishments of the superpowers. There are a
number of small centers supported by private
funds, or nestling in inconspicuous niches of
universities. Examples are the Canadian
Peace Research Institute, the Center for Re-
search on Conflict Resolution at the Univer-
sity of Michigan, the Citizen’s Committee on
Nuclear Information in St. Louis, Missouri,
the Conflict Research Center in Copenhagen,
and the Oslo Peace Research Institute. The
Stockholm Peace Research Institute is insti-
tutionalized in the sense of being government-
supported ; but since Sweden is a neutral
country, it should be counted with the &dquo;in-
dependent&dquo; research centers. The product of
these institutions is publications. These range
widely in subject matter from public opinion
surveys to historical essays, from mathemati-
cal models of arms races to assessments of
ethnocentrism, from military economics to
the theory of games. Much of this work
could easily be subsumed under academic
social science. It stems from the same sort of
motivation, and is pursued by the same meth-
ods. One finds review articles, reports of
experiments (for example, in simulated con-
flict), methodological discussions, collections
of data, data processsed into &dquo;indices,&dquo; data
supporting or refuting hypotheses, etc.
Needless to say, the financial situation of
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all these centers is chronically precarious.
Procurement of funds is invariably associated
with a statement of aims, and it is usually
most difficult to justify support for the pur-
pose of advancing knowledge for knowledge’s
sake. This can be done in the case of long-
established disciplines like astronomy or
philosophy. &dquo;Peace research,&dquo; however, is
not an established discipline-not even a dis-
cipline, for that matter. It is distinctly &dquo;inter-
disciplinary.&dquo; This term still retains some of
its magic (although much of it has worn thin),
but the avowed aims of &dquo;interdisciplinary&dquo;
research efforts have always been problem-
oriented. In fact, the principal rationale for
interdisciplinary endeavor is that of counter-
acting the fractionation of science by illumi-
nating &dquo;problems&dquo; from several directions.
At any rate, peace research is not in a posi-
tion to ignore the applicability of its product
to the &dquo;problem&dquo; of war.
What impact can we expect from the prod-
ucts of the independent peace research cen-
ters ? One hope is that the very activity of the
centers will serve to keep &dquo;the problem&dquo; in
the public eye or at least will claim the atten-
tion of the academic community, especially
among the young. The centers can provide at
least a temporary niche for young people ea-
ger to do &dquo;relevant&dquo; research, and so prepare
the cadres for future constructive develop-
ments in social science. Another hope is that
the centers can make an impact by dissemi-
nating information to the general public. This
function of peace research was adopted, for
example, by the Citizen’s Committee on Nu-
clear Information in St. Louis. They publi-
cized facts about the effects of atmospheric
testing of nuclear weapons that had been
suppressed or semi-suppressed by government
agencies. Later the same committee published
analyses of the effectiveness (or the lack
of it) of fallout shelters and brought the issue
of &dquo;civil defense&dquo; into the limelight of vigor-
ous public debate. To take another example,
the Stockholm Peace Research Institute has
been conducting studies on the effects of
bacteriological warfare and on world arma-
ment trade. The implicit (sometimes explicit)
assumption in these enterprises is that the
dissemination of information, to which the
public might otherwise not have access, helps
to educate the public in matters pertaining to
the problem of war, and that an informed
citizenry may be better equipped to cope with
measures that lead to war.
Researchers involved in this work empha-
size the importance of keeping the informative
and the persuasive aspects of the dissemina-
tion of information strictly separate. The
authority of the scientist, they argue, resides
in his freedom from bias. In fact, the primary,
perhaps the sole responsibility of the scientist,
the argument goes, is the acquisition and the
dissemination of knowledge; and it is not his
function as a scientist to persuade. He may, of
course, do this as a citizen, but must always
be careful to separate the two roles. This in-
sistence on the &dquo;neutrality of science&dquo; stems
from a conviction that only if the total &dquo;ob-
jectivity&dquo; of science is preserved can science
retain its authority in human affairs.
One might say in passing that the &dquo;objectiv-
ity of science&dquo; does not extend to the choice
of research directions. Decisions about what
is relevant or important knowledge depends
as much on the convictions and commitments
of the scientist as on his dispassionate exami-
nation of facts and carefully reasoned con-
clusions. Be that as it may, one will readily
grant that the &dquo;authority of science&dquo; derives
from its freedom from bias once the direction
of research and the method of investigation
have been chosen. However, in discussing the
possible impact of peace research on policies
concerned with war and peace, the main ques-
tion is not whether science enjoys authority
but whether the authority of science makes
any difference in the policies. The policy-
makers do not need to dispute the findings on
the effects of nuclear fallout, on the effects
of bacteriological warfare, or on the extent of
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world armament trade. Neither do they need
or are they likely to take these findings into
account in designing and pursuing their poli-
cies. The only relevant effect of the dissemina-
tion of information is its possible influence
on the population as a whole. If the informa-
tion made available does in fact reach the
public, or politically important sectors of it,
and if the publics so informed are moved to
action, and if this action does have political
results, then we can say that &dquo;peace research&dquo;
has made an impact by way of producing
relevant knowledge and disseminating it. So
far, such impacts have been spotty and, in
general, they are difficult to assess. There may
be, however, a cumulative effect that will
eventually be manifested in stronger and more
consistent action.
But it should be clear that, in fulfilling its
enlightening function, peace research does
not thereby contribute to an &dquo;applied science.&dquo;
It would, only if the knowledge produced by it
were used to organize and guide (not merely
motivate) actions directed toward the preven-
tion of war or the establishment of peace. As
has been said, governments are not likely
(except in certain limited areas) to be guided
by knowledge produced by peace research;
while publics, although they may be aroused
to resist policies that aggravate the danger of
war, or to advocate policies that advance
peace, also need some knowledge of ways to
organize and direct effective action. Such
knowledge is not at present generated by
peace research.
Criminology provides an analogous ex-
ample. On the one hand, criminology is an
academic discipline concerned with the gene-
sis, the epidemiology, and the psychology of
crime. This is pure, not applied, science so
long as its findings are not used as a concrete
guide to action with regard to crime (which by
and large they are not). There is also another
kind of criminology: the science of crime de-
tection with its laboratories, records, methods
of information retrieval, etc. This criminol-
ogy is, of course, an applied science. Aca-
demic criminology as a pure science may
provide valuable insights into the roots of
crime; but as long as it remains a pure science,
that is, as long as it is not coupled with knowl-
edge of how to translate its insights into con-
crete actions-knowledge of who is to do
what, when, where, and how-criminological
research can make no impact on crime.
The police criminologist, although he has
at his disposal techniques for identifying and
apprehending individual criminals, is likewise
powerless to deal with crime as a social
phenomenon. There is no necessary connec-
tion between the efficiency of detection tech-
niques and the incidence of crime. Is there a
way of combining the relevance of the aca-
demic criminologist’s insights with the ef-
fectiveness of the police criminologist’s
techniques? There may be. There are prob-
lems of intermediate scope, more concrete
than the academic criminologist’s but reach-
ing deeper into the social structure than the
policeman’s problems.
Consider the task of eradicating crime, not
in the abstract, but in one of its concrete yet
broad social manifestations-for example,
organized crime in the United States. The task
would require a considerable amount of
sophisticated research. The structure of crim-
inal syndicates would have to be understood
in all its intricacy; also the interconnections
between the syndicates and the political ma-
chines, and between these and business in-
terests.
If the task is kept constantly in mind, the
thrust of the research will have to be directed
toward discovering the nexus of these inter-
connections, their vulnerable links, etc. It
may turn out that research of this sort would
require certain interventions: for example,
attempts to disrupt the operations of the crim-
inal syndicate in order to see how it responds
to threat. Clearly, then, the research effort
would have to be coupled with social action.
It may involve the enlistment of people out-
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side the research organization proper, people
with practical experience in such matters. It
is also clear that all these activities could not
be kept on the level of &dquo;moral neutrality,&dquo;
which is typically demanded of the scientist.
The people involved may be required to take
considerable risks and so would have to be
strongly committed.
There would thus be a price to pay. The
traditional separation of the &dquo;discovery of
truth&dquo; and of action on the basis of commit-
ments would have to be abandoned, because
the very nature of the research would demand
that the two be combined.
I believe the situation in peace research is
similar to that in criminology. On the one
hand it is possible to develop broad theories
of war and peace, of conflict and conflict reso-
lution. These may give us valuable insights
into the genesis of wars and the conditions of
peace. So long as these insights are not
coupled with specific knowledge of how to
prevent some conditions or bring about oth-
ers, the insights will be of little or no im-
mediate help in preventing war or promoting
peace. Projects for a world government, for
restructuring the United Nations, for dis-
armament, or for reorganizing world eco-
nomics can make no impact unless the re-
search that inspired them also produces
knowledge of how actually to implement these
projects.
On the other hand, certain specific applic-
able techniques of conflict resolution or
tension-reduction may emerge from peace
research. The &dquo;safeguards&dquo; put on automated
war technology may reduce the itch on the
trigger fingers. Other techniques may be use-
ful in specific instances-for example, in
communal strife, or in wars between small
nations that can be arrested by &dquo;higher au-
thority&dquo; ; in short, in those cases where insti-
tutions empowered to control the conflicts
already exist (or can be created) and where
new techniques put at their disposal can make
them more effective.
As in the case of the two criminologies, we
have, on one level, broad &dquo;pure&dquo; peace re-
search that remains impotent in dealing with
war as an actual occurrence, and, on another,
a set of techniques that may alleviate the
symptoms without reaching to the roots of the
problem.
We need an intermediate research task, one
directed at a &dquo;large&dquo; problem, such as the
chronic danger of a devastating war between
nuclear powers, and yet at the same time a
concrete one, centered on the operation of
actual war-making institutions. In choosing
such a task, the eclectic attitude toward the
&dquo;causes of war&dquo; would have to be abandoned.
A specific hypothesis would have to be cho-
sen ; for example, that war between great
powers, far from being an aberration, is a nor-
mal activity of military establishments, in the
same way that organized crime is a normal
activity of criminal syndicates. On a priori
grounds, such a hypothesis is no more and no
less credible than other hypotheses or philo-
sophic conceptions of war, such as &dquo;War is a
manifestation of man’s aggressive urges,&dquo; or
&dquo;War is a malfunctioning of the international
system instigated by a disturbance of the
balance of power,&dquo; or &dquo;War is a political
instrument.&dquo; Note that all these conceptions
of war are academically respectable, while
&dquo;War is an analogue of organized crime&dquo;
apparently is not. The onus of the latter de-
rives from two sources. One, already men-
tioned, is that, if the conception is adopted
as a hypothesis, its test involves action of the
sort that violates the dictum of separating the
scientist’s responsibilities from his political
commitment. Another source is that the hy-
pothesis is easily confused with a conspiracy
theory of the sort advanced by cranks.
The latter objection is not warranted. The
operations of &dquo;real&dquo; criminal syndicates do
indeed involve conspiracies, because they cir-
cumvent statute laws. The operations of mili-
tary establishments do not. Tb< investigation
of the institutional stnv .tIre of military
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establishments, of their sources of power, and
of their interconnections with the total insti-
tutional structures of war-waging states would
be directed not toward exposing a conspiracy
but toward revealing the &dquo;normal&dquo; function-
ing of an organic system. In this sense, the
underlying philosophic orientation would be
rather similar to the one embodied in the con-
ception of war as a disease. Here the ambigu-
ity of the term &dquo;normal&dquo; would be revealed.
A parasite within a host functions &dquo;normal-
ly&dquo; as a parasite. But the host is sick. In this
conception, war would appear not as a disease
that now and then &dquo;befalls&dquo; the organism but
as one that resides within the organism as a
malignancy with its characteristic hyper-
trophy and parasitism.
It remains true, however, that the concep-
tion of war as an analogue to organized crime,
unlike other academically more respectable
conceptions, would lead peace research into
areas of activity traditionally avoided by
scholars and scientists practicing their calling.
In particular, as Gabriel Kolko has pointed
out ( The Nation, October 9, 1967), one of the
vulnerable spots of the United States military
establishment is its extensive dependence on
universities, where some of the most impor-
tant war research is carried out. Peace
researchers in universities are thus in a favor-
able position to gain and disseminate knowl-
edge about the extent and the nature of war
research coupled with knowledge, gained from
experience in action on campuses, of how the
military machine can be attacked where it is
vulnerable.
Further, like the investigation of the opera-
tions of criminal syndicates and of their inter-
connections with the entire institutional struc-
ture, the investigation of the war machine and
of its connections would involve social or
political action, and would probably make
necessary the enlistment of people outside
the research community proper. The product
of such research would be not only an under-
standing of how the war machine operates,
and how the war machines of rival great
powers support each other, but also, perhaps,
some ideas of how to prevent the global war
machine from fulfilling its &dquo;normal&dquo; function,
that function being fatal to humanity.
Perhaps from this fusion of knowledge-
seeking and social action, an &dquo;applied science
of peace&dquo; will emerge, just as in another age
natural science was born when philosophers
overcame their reluctance to handle things
and moved into laboratories, that is, work-
shops where craftsmen and artists were al-
ready busy.
